Tue 1 May 2007
What better way to start a blog about database security than to discuss what is possibly the biggest data breach ever?
It now seems that several banks are suing TJX over claimed losses of tens of millions of dollars – so negligence in data protection carries a cash penalty, not just nebulous damage to reputation. Gross negligence, in fact – this is not some one-off lapse in judgment such as a laptop with sensitive information forgotten on a bus, or a CD lost in the post.
The details recently published about the ongoing investigation provide insight into what possibly happened:
- The breach lasted 17 months: For 17 months someone (or more than one person) was systematically stealing data. I can only infer from this that security measures and procedures at TJX were grossly inadequate. It also means the breach was not accidental – it may have been opportunistic at first, but certainly malicious after that. More likely it was malicious from the start.
- Insider(s) were involved: It seems that some encrypted credit card data was decrypted using keys, which only an insider with privileged access would have. Whether such an insider was knowingly complicit or duped into divulging such information is unknown, but it shows us all what the sophisticated criminals already know – why bother sweating and hacking your way through firewalls and IDS when it’s so much simpler to use an insider?
- Utter lack of visibility: Most astonishing of all, “more than 50 experts TJX put on the case have reached no conclusions. Besides not knowing how many thieves were involved, TJX isn’t sure whether there was one continuing intrusion or multiple separate break-ins, according to a March 28 regulatory filing.”
In other words, the thieves either did a great job of covering their tracks (and they certainly had ample time to do that!), or worse, they didn’t have to do it because their actions were invisible to begin with…
It is clear that even a rudimentary audit could have prevented the breach from going undiscovered for so long. It is also evident that encryption alone wasn’t enough to protect the data, and that perimeter defenses such as firewalls are useless against inside jobs like this one.
But ultimately, the entire thing could have been prevented with real-time monitoring and intrusion prevention at the database level.
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